Bitcoin Quantum-Break Catastrophe Is Pure FUD, Says Gabor Gurbacs
A heated debate erupted on X this weekend after Gabor Gurbacs, founding father of Pointsville and strategic advisor to Tether, dismissed rising fears about Bitcoin’s vulnerability to quantum computing. In a sequence of posts, Gurbacs known as the notion of a “quantum doomsday” for Bitcoin “pure FUD,” arguing that Bitcoin’s cryptographic foundations are already resilient and adaptable sufficient to outlive future advances in quantum know-how.
“There’s plenty of FUD round Bitcoin’s quantum danger,” Gurbacs wrote. “The truth is that Bitcoin’s safety is anchored in hash-based proof-of-work, which stays quantum-resistant. Quantum doesn’t break Bitcoin.”
Bitcoin Is “Quantum-Resilient By Design”
Gurbacs pointed to the excellence between Bitcoin’s hash-based consensus and its signature scheme, arguing that the consensus layer—secured by SHA-256—is already immune to quantum assaults. Grover’s algorithm solely supplies a quadratic speed-up, he stated, which doesn’t undermine Bitcoin’s proof-of-work. The major theoretical weak spot, he acknowledged, lies in Bitcoin’s ECDSA signatures, which could possibly be susceptible if quantum computer systems attain the size required to run Shor’s algorithm successfully.
But in keeping with Gurbacs, even that risk is mitigated by greatest practices and Bitcoin’s modular design. “The primary quantum goal (ECDSA public keys) is already mitigated by non-reuse of addresses and might be upgraded to post-quantum signatures,” he famous, referencing NIST’s newly standardized FIPS-205, which formalizes the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA).
“Bitcoin’s long-term safety mannequin was designed exactly for adversarial upgrades,” he added. “The consensus layer is hash-based and quantum-resilient, and the signature layer is modular, that means post-quantum schemes like SLH-DSA/SPHINCS+ might be built-in with out disrupting financial integrity or provide guidelines.”
That assertion drew speedy responses from crypto safety veterans, together with Messari co-founder Dan McArdle and Project Eleven’s Graeme Moore, who each warned that Gurbacs was underestimating the complexity and timeline of a network-wide post-quantum transition.
McArdle agreed that mining and proof-of-work are usually not at speedy danger however outlined three structural points Bitcoin should nonetheless face: legacy P2PK outputs with already-exposed public keys, the potential for mempool sniping (quantum theft throughout transaction propagation), and the big dimension of post-quantum signatures, which may pressure a controversial blocksize improve.
“Given all that,” McArdle stated, “it’s greatest to get severe about quantum robustness now. It’s not a problem to kick down the highway till the risk is imminent.”
Gurbacs pushed again, calling these dangers “actual however distant.” The few P2PK addresses are “small and scattered,” and the sort of quantum computer systems required for mempool assaults are “unbelievably quick and secure—which we’re nowhere close to.” He added that BTC may take up bigger signature schemes or perhaps a blocksize improve “earlier than any practical risk exhibits up.”
“I agree we must always take quantum hardening critically,” Gurbacs wrote. “I simply don’t purchase the concept we’re near a break—and scammers are likely to abuse the quantum narrative. The greater danger now could be individuals panicking as a substitute of taking a look at precise timelines.”
The Open Questions For Bitcoin Devs
Graeme Moore countered that complacency is the better hazard. Citing his agency’s analysis, he argued {that a} coordinated post-quantum migration may take six months or extra even beneath ultimate situations and that “we may have a CRQC in a pair years.” He pressed Gurbacs on whether or not the Bitcoin neighborhood may realistically agree on adopting NIST-approved requirements like SLH-DSA or ML-DSA—particularly since Satoshi Nakamoto deliberately prevented NIST curves for mistrust causes.
Moore additionally raised the thorny query of what occurs to unmigrated or “misplaced” cash in a quantum transition, together with Satoshi’s early holdings. “Are you in favor of freezing Satoshi’s cash?” he requested. “Why or why not?”
Gurbacs replied that governance decisions ought to apply equally to all unmigrated keys and rejected any “particular guidelines.” He reiterated that the risk isn’t existential within the close to time period. “We’ll see weaker cryptosystems fall first,” he stated. “That buys years of warning for choosing schemes, implementing and testing, and permitting gradual opt-in rotation earlier than the ‘oh shit’ second.”
While Moore insisted that “we’re already on the ‘oh shit’ second,” Gurbacs disagreed. “If an actual CRQC existed on the degree wanted to interrupt secp256k1,” he argued, “the primary indicators wouldn’t present up in Bitcoin. They’d present up in TLS, PGP, authorities PKI, and weaker ECC techniques lengthy earlier than. That merely hasn’t occurred.”
For now, Gurbacs’ place is obvious: quantum computing represents a long-term coordination problem, not an imminent collapse. “Quantum panic is misplaced,” he stated. “Bitcoin’s structure is adaptable, conservative, and mathematically strong. Quantum doesn’t break Bitcoin.”
Gurbacs has additionally acquired unbiased approval from OG Adam Back. Via X, the legendary cypherpunk wrote: “Bitcoin can simply add a brand new signature sort, and make a “quantum prepared” taproot leaf various spend methodology, beneath taproot/schnorr. In that manner you might be prepared with out paying the price of giant signatures till it turns into related. NIST standardized SLH-DSA aug 2024 solely.”
He added: “If cryptographically related quantum computer systems are developed, then my guess is schnorr & ECDSA signature strategies could be deprecated (grow to be unspendable). IMO it’s lots additional away than 2030 so individuals ought to have time emigrate and be quantum prepared lengthy earlier than.”
At press time, BTC traded at $85,984.
